Here's my first iteration of an attempt. An information processor that recognizes associations as being associations has awareness of those associations. Recognition only means carrying state about other states. For example, the computer that measures CPU temperature to control its fan keeps state on the conditions of the fan and CPU temps. It recognizes the dependence between the two, and so has awareness of the association between CPU temperature and fan speed.But we haven't defined it.
I define SELF as the concept that is formed from the awareness of the distinction between internal and external states. We describe an information processor with a notion of SELF as having consciousness.
I haven't seen any evidence to suggest that a continuum-like "soul" is necessary to explain consciousness. In contrast, there is a ton of evidence pointing to a mechanistic explanation of life.What if it's as weird as the "continuum" — and there might be a "continuum" element to the being that has nothing to do with n associated states (Cue: "soul").
Incorrect. Any non-empty interval of ℝ, no matter how small (by Lebesgue measure), is 100% of ℝ. That's what makes it a continuum. We can map every point in [0.0001, 0.0002] to the entire real line, or to the entire Euclidean plane, or to the entire 1024-dimensional Euclidean hyperplane.ℝ as a set, for example, is really a continuum. Any interval in the continuum is 0% of the rest of it, but yet we can point to an interval, as though we can "rationalize" or "discretize" a portion as "one componental thing," but it's not a fraction of the rest of it.
