I'm therefore using the term "mind" as short-hand for that undefined "somewhere."

That works for me. Brain refers to the physical organ, mind to its undefined and mysterious aspects.

The question assumes both the "dog" and the "light" exist "independent of" the "ones" in this mysterious "undefined somewhere" we are using to help identify them (again, "mind," or "meta-brain" or "<insert term>" for now, if you agree?).

Might I ask that you use less quotation marks? The "sentence" above is not a "pleasant" read ("it" is not "easy" to "parse").

With that out of the way, notice that my assumptions do not include a conscious entity to identify the reflected light as a dog. The receiver of the light could well be a CCD sensor array in a camera. The fundamental point is that information was transferred, changing the state of the receiver. Whether that receiver is a brain or a camera does not matter.

Assuming that dogs and light exist independently in the universe, when light is reflected off of a dog, I claim that the light carries with it information about the dog. When a suitable receiver of light, such as a camera, interacts with this light, the receiver gains information about the dog. So, I ask you again, where in the light is the dog?

 

Might I ask that you use less quotation marks? The "sentence" above is not a "pleasant" read ("it" is not "easy" to "parse").
...
That works for me. Brain refers to the physical organ, mind to its undefined and mysterious aspects.

Sure — in particular now that you are cool with using mind to define all that is not in the physical brain, it will be understood the discussion now involving these elements in this nascent context are now effectively being defined with respect to this mystery zone in real time.

With that out of the way, notice that my assumptions do not include a conscious entity to identify the reflected light as a dog. The receiver of the light could well be a CCD sensor array in a camera. The fundamental point is that information was transferred, changing the state of the receiver. Whether that receiver is a brain or a camera does not matter.

Agreed 100% as written.

Assuming that dogs and light exist independently in the universe, when light is reflected off of a dog, I claim that the light carries with it information about the dog. When a suitable receiver of light, such as a camera, interacts with this light, the receiver gains information about the dog. So, I ask you again, where in the light is the dog?

If we are going to observe, evaluate, and discuss things in the now agreed upon mind, perhaps an objective lexical framework could be determined here to define things that are generally not within the bounds of mainstream theoretics.

If you are game, perhaps—in the same manner of defining waveling (which I'm still amazed there is no prior scientific term for such)—there are novel terms that could be appropriated for this task that will permit a scientifically plausible bridge into these areas.

In the mind, we have the dog and the light.

The light carries information about the dog to the brain, but the dog is not in the brain; so logically, neither is the light. Ergo, the light is containing the information about the dog, but the light itself is also information, because it can also be referred to as a something that carried the info about something else.

If the dog and light is not in the brain, what makes us think that the receiver of the information reflecting the dog presence in the mind is not also within the same addressable general "locale" in this something called the mind?

The element that is receiving this information about the dog in the light could then be considered another something in the mind. That's you, me, or I—the intrinsic properties of this particular thing as yet undefined—but I think this is reasonable to assume.

If the dog, the light, and the you are separate, distinctly referable elements in this something called the mind, then presumably we can further define something to be of two types:

1) Spatial Place
2) 3D Unitary Element

Both of which presumably could also be called universes.

The mind is of type #1: a spatial place that houses the 3D unitary elements of dog, light and you.

Within the spatial place of the mind, we are now free to use prepositions to denote movement in its environment. The dog, light, and you in the mind, a veritable "universe" housing a sequence of events within it, whereby the light reflects off the dog, in turn sending frequencies of information to you which reflect the knowable actuality of the dog in that space.

Where is the dog?

As aforementioned, I believe it's necessary to define all of these things — light, dog, you, me within the mind as somethings.

This is the reason I liked Boole's original definition here:

Let 1 = "A universe of thinkable thoughts"

Now, as you pointed out earlier, 1 as a quantity is not necessary here. You could say "black" or "åº∂©ª£". As long as it's a unique token, it works.

Because the unique token is actually a logic state. The logic state of true.

However, the reason 1 works better, is due to important conceptual overlap with logic states and numbers.

Computers compute. But computation is the activity of manipulating and evaluating digits. But what does a digital computer exclusively compute with in reality? Logic states.

This is profound, because while numbers are in a digital computer, they're also simply unique strings of what might be called "bounded logic states" (if that works).

Here one could equate numbers with these contextually sensitive logic states.

There would logically be only 2 elementary logic states in the mind: something or nothing.

That's why 1 and 0 works very well as both numbers and contrasting logic states that represent "existence" or "nonexistence" in the mind. True = presence of 3D observable thing; false = no presence of 3D observable thing.

It would then follow if we can define something in the mind as 1, we can define a contrasting token 0 as nothing.

Quantity (yet undefined in this new model) 1 means "It is TRUE that there IS presence of something in a locality within the mind's space." Quantity 0 means "It is TRUE that there is the presence of nothing".

We can now re-reckon Boole's law as:

Let 1 = something in the mind

Let 0 = nothing in the mind

This is important, because as MrAl pointed out earlier with the hole in the cube question, the dog exists as something in the mind, but a hole can "eat" the dog, leaving "nothing" there. Dog in effect went from 1 to 0. The hole is 0 (with some kind of bounding), representing the bounded area of no observable 3D properties, AKA "nothing."

The hole would be an area of the mind that is not occupied by an observable something but has the abiding potential to do so. Perhaps the "default state of the space comprising the mind's bounds."

But since we're talking about this mysterious property in the spatial thing called the mind, I would say there's no such thing as "objective nothingness." It would therefore be considered an illusion, where the potential for an actual, measurable emergence exists is something we simply default to denoting as nothing semantically (really, no-thing there).

Goal here in my mind is to develop an integrated novel model for existence, reason, information and even life itself (which is also technically still undefined) by extending science's scope into regions it normally relegates to philosophical or religious babble.

(Incidentally, as a side-note: the reason I was linguistically all about keeping a parent wave "separately" defined from its wavelings as actually addressable "things": while the parent wave IS the wavelings, we're in the mind-space here—if you'd agree, the wavelings could be thought of as separate things while also defining the light wave itself).

If you're on board with any of that, we can perhaps explore what the space is made of—things like its potential innate properties, real vs. nonreal abstractions, senses vs. sensors, infinity vs. numeric, experiential components, and theoretical nature of reason, numbers and waves—all within this working model...

 

Sure — in particular now that you are cool with using mind to define all that is not in the physical brain, it will be understood the discussion now involving these elements in this nascent context are now effectively being defined with respect to this mystery zone in real time.

I reject the "not in the physical brain" condition as an unjustifiable assumption. Humanity's history contains innumerable examples of supposedly non-physical phenomena that, after sufficient research, were ultimately found to be physical. So, unless we're performing a thought experiment in which a non-physical mind is explicitly given as an axiom, our default position -- our null hypothesis -- should be that everything, including the mysterious aspects of the brain that we're calling mind, is physical.

If we are going to observe, evaluate, and discuss things in the now agreed upon mind...

That's precisely what I'm trying to avoid! I've repeatedly emphasized that, when exploring the foundations of information, jumping into the deep end with human minds is both unnecessary and needlessly complicating. Since you keep taking us back to mind, I have to ask your intent. Is it that you believe that mind is a necessary part of information? If so, we should address that.

Or, is it the case that the subject of information is really just a springboard for you to explore the subject of mind? If so, I politely bow out. Long ago, I started my intellectual journey in Western philosophy -- from the pre-Socratics to Wittgenstein -- and eventually figured out that, if I want to know what the hell any of this means, philosophy wasn't the way to find out. It's not that the goals of philosophy are wrong or unimportant; personally, I would much rather be able to understand what consciousness is than what black holes are. But mind is a really hard problem, likely much harder than, say, P != NP or the Riemann hypothesis. And, for me, the history of philosophy plainly indicates how ineffective philosophizing about the mind actually is. So, I have very little interest in trying to add to the philosophical noise.

Goal here in my mind is to develop an integrated novel model for existence, reason, information and even life itself (which is also technically still undefined) by extending science's scope into regions it normally relegates to philosophical or religious babble.

I think that's too ambitious, though it serves as a fine distinction between the philosophical way and the scientific way. Each of those concepts -- existence, reason, information, life -- is an entire discipline onto itself. The scientific approach is to first reduce and then synthesize. A big concept get broken down into smaller constituent parts, each of which becomes its own scientific field. With time and research, the parts become smaller and smaller, leading to specialized subfields. The scientists in a subfield tackle only the problems of their subfield, letting other scientists worry about the various other parts. As a subfield matures, the fruits of its research become "givens" in other fields, allowing scientists in other fields to simply assume entire theories without having to account for them in their own work. A marine biologist uses the cell model in her work without having to build the model up herself; that work was done by molecular biologists, who themselves co-opted the models of chemists, who themselves co-opted the models of physicists. Specialization allows for incredibly complex systems to be thoroughly and efficiently understood at multiple levels.

In contrast, philosophers -- especially those writing about metaphysics -- tend to be system builders, writing ponderous tomes that attempt to construct and explain all of reality in one fell swoop. As history shows, this approach has never worked. I'd urge you not to fall into that trap.

 

I reject the "not in the physical brain" condition as an unjustifiable assumption. Humanity's history contains innumerable examples of supposedly non-physical phenomena that, after sufficient research, were ultimately found to be physical. So, unless we're performing a thought experiment in which a non-physical mind is explicitly given as an axiom, our default position -- our null hypothesis -- should be that everything, including the mysterious aspects of the brain that we're calling mind, is physical.

You agree the dog is not in the brain.

Then you agreed to call “mind” the “mysterious portion of the brain.”

Where is the 3D dog if it’s not in the brain, and why does the “mind” a sh*t give?

I called it the “mind” because I don’t show partiality between tokens “mind” and “reality.” There is no scientific justification to treat them separate yet. The CCD sensor array, iPad, or kerosene lamp or any other physical object doesn’t see itself as separate from “physical reality” (whatever that is!), so why should the brain again?

Then I endeavored to crystalize this thinking into some viable, discussable framework starting from brutally simple non-partial assumptions.

What is the issue here?

I want nothing more than the objective truth. I don’t care what we label it as, and don’t care what it looks like, and I’m open to anything logical.

 

You agree the dog is not in the brain.

The physical dog -- the thing that is reflecting light waves -- is not in the brain. Check.

Then you agreed to call “mind” the “mysterious portion of the brain.”

For me, "mind" encapsulates notions, such as consciousness, for which we have no adequate physical models.

But then you said the dog is not in the brain.

Where is the 3D dog if it’s not in the brain.

I'm not sure what you mean by "3D dog". Assuming you mean the physical dog -- the thing that is reflecting light -- it exists in some particular volume of space. That volume of space is not shared by the brain perceiving it.

I called it the “mind” because I don’t show partiality between “mind” and “reality.” There is no scientific justification to treat them separate yet.

Both "mind" and "reality" are imprecise, non-scientific terms, so there's no scientific justification for treating them separately or equally. Informally, I would use mind to characterize "consciousness-like stuff"; I take reality as a label to represent all that is true in the universe, whether it is knowable by us or not. In this usage, reality is what the universe actually is, as opposed to what we perceive it to be.

What is the issue here?

Mind, as we've agreed, is the mysterious, unknown aspects of the brain. My issue is that mind is mysterious and unknown for a very good reason -- it's incredibly difficult (potentially impossible) to reason about clearly. I don't want to get into a discussion about mind.

As for reality, my issue is that -- as I've defined it -- reality refers to the universe as it actually is. But we as humans can only interpret what we observe. If it's possible even in principle (which I doubt), knowing what actually is seems beyond the scope of a forum post.

I want nothing more than the truth. I don’t care what you want to call it, and don’t care what it looks like, and I’m open to anything logical.

Whatever it is that we're discussing, I'd suggest starting at the shallow end of the pool, choosing something tractable and building from there.

 

I don't want to get into a discussion about mind.

As for reality, my issue is that -- as I've defined it -- reality refers to the universe as it actually is. But we as humans can only interpret what we observe. If it's possible even in principle (which I doubt), knowing what actually is seems beyond the scope of a forum post.

“Knowing what actually is” is what I’m interested in. And I believe it can be triangulated via careful lexical framework right here. Nobody else I’ve found tracks this sh*t like you, so you’re not quitting now, you’re knee-deep in this, and you’re not escaping!

The grey matter is composed of discrete countable particles. No one group of discrete particles in this mass “cares” about any other group within itself, correct? In the same way the “photo diode” doesn’t care about the “transfer gate” in a CCD. You made an express point of leveling the playing field here with physical objects.

Point is, we’re discussing componental elements that are, in essence a disparate-parts contraption.

Agreed?

 

“Knowing what actually is” is what I’m interested in. And I believe it can be triangulated via careful lexical framework right here. Nobody else I’ve found tracks this sh*t like you, so you’re not quitting now, you’re knee-deep in this, and you’re not escaping!

Lol! Let's get to it, then.

The grey matter is composed of discrete countable particles. No one group of discrete particles in this mass “cares” about any other group within itself, correct? In the same way the “photo diode” doesn’t care about the “transfer gate” in a CCD.

By particles, do you mean the neurons, the individual brain cells; or do you mean the subatomic components that make up the neurons? Assuming the former (the latter would get messy trying to keep track of throughout), I agree that each neuron is functionally independent from the rest. And, like the subcircuits in a CCD, the brain seems to use groups of neurons as processing blocks. I think we're on the same page, so far.

 

Lol! Let's get to it, then.

Good, good! I’m glad you’re on-board with your captivity here: 12 pages, thousands of words, 3000 views, dozens or hundreds of a captive audience... we figure out the meaning of life here or bust, you hear?

By particles, do you mean the neurons, the individual brain cells; or do you mean the subatomic components that make up the neurons? Assuming the former (the latter would get messy trying to keep track of throughout), I agree that each neuron is functionally independent from the rest. And, like the subcircuits in a CCD, the brain seems to use groups of neurons as processing blocks. I think we're on the same page, so far.

I agree, with the express condition the granularity of that observational “zoom level” doesn’t impact any inference on your end. I.e., zoom level is set, and it’s not any kind of get-out-jail-free card later on!
Now then... You ascribe a certain equality to all physical objects, information-processing wise.

Can you please elaborate on the specific nature of that equality in 4 million words or less?

 

Now then... You ascribe a certain equality to all physical objects, information-processing wise.

Can you please elaborate on the specific nature of that equality in 4 million words or less?

I'm trying to remember in what information-processing context I ascribed equality to all physical objects. I'm pretty sure I'd agree that anything that is capable of processing n units of information is isomorphic to any other thing capable of processing n units of information. I'm more confident in the notion that any medium capable of delivering n bits of information is isomorphic to any other such medium. (If you're comfortable with it, I propose that we settle on the bit as the fundamental unit of information, with the understanding that even a continuum of information can be represented in n bits, provided we let \( n \to \infty \).)

 

I'm trying to remember in what information-processing context I ascribed equality to all physical objects. I'm pretty sure I'd agree that anything that is capable of processing n units of information is isomorphic to any other thing capable of processing n units of information. I'm more confident in the notion that any medium capable of delivering n bits of information is isomorphic to any other such medium. (If you're comfortable with it, I propose that we settle on the bit as the fundamental unit of information, with the understanding that even a continuum of information can be represented in n bits, provided we let n→∞.)

Yes, fully concur.

Would you agree there are 3 distinct elements in the above scenario:

1) The bits
2) The wave
3) The dog

...?

 

...also, by “3D dog,” I meant the dog exists with 3 dimensional metrics, as in an x, y, and z component within space. Does that work?

 

(3 of 3)

From your brain’s perspective, why is the dog not in the brain, but the image of it is? What’s endowing the partiality?

The dog “outside” the brain assumes it exists “in” something. The brain is in this something as well. How is “space” represented in the brain, if it is the working environment where all that is perceived exists?

I.e., at what point is the correlation happening between the discrete numbers, the continuous wave and “the dog?” If the dog does not exist as an indivisible unitary geometric entity “somewhere, apart from the brain”, how is the information about it even relevant to the brain?

If the wave is not the dog itself, and neither are the bits, the wave and the bits are nondescript entities without this “thing” they’re referencing as the “knowable” actuality.

That said, do you draw a distinction between the thought form that is the dog and the physical entity that is the dog?

This hearkens to my original question concerning the cube. It exists as a 3D object with hard corners. Without the ability to first identify the object in the mind’s eye, there’s no ability to identify it in physical space separate from the brain. In the mind’s eye and space, the object does not exist *as described* in a CT scan.

So how can it logically exist in the brain as described. The waves that describe it correlate to it. You can describe it in space in a rigid scientific manner using these waves. But there’s a disconnect between how the brain is describing the object in physical reality, how it isometrically exists in the thought “realm”, and how it “exists”. To “know” is obviously then different than to “deliver n bits of information” as if the brain is a dumb terminal hooked up to a hard drive. No subset of the n bits is intrinsically tied to any other unless they co-correlate to a continuous, indivisible element that comprises them.

That said, would you agree there is a distinction between delivering n bits of information and knowing you’re delivering n bits of information?

If so, ”knowing” must be a supra-numeric phenomenon, no?

 

(3 of 3)

From your brain’s perspective, why is the dog not in the brain, but the image of it is? What’s endowing the partiality?

The dog “outside” the brain assumes it exists “in” something. The brain is in this something as well. How is “space” represented in the brain, if it is the working environment where all that is perceived exists?

I.e., at what point is the correlation happening between the discrete numbers, the continuous wave and “the dog?” If the dog does not exist as an indivisible unitary geometric entity “somewhere, apart from the brain”, how is the information about it even relevant to the brain?

If the wave is not the dog itself, and neither are the bits, the wave and the bits are nondescript entities without this “thing” they’re referencing as the “knowable” actuality.

That said, do you draw a distinction between the thought form that is the dog and the physical entity that is the dog?

This hearkens to my original question concerning the cube. It exists as a 3D object with hard corners. Without the ability to first identify the object in the mind’s eye, there’s no ability to identify it in physical space separate from the brain. In the mind’s eye and space, the object does not exist *as described* in a CT scan.

So how can it logically exist in the brain as described. The waves that describe it correlate to it. You can deaceibe it in space in a rigid scientific manner using these waves. But there’s a disconnect between how the brain is describing the object in physical reality, how it isometrically exists in the thought “realm”, and how it “exists”. To “know” is obviously then different than to “deliver n bits of information” as if the brain is a dumb terminal hooked up to a hard drive. No subset of the n bits is intrinsically tied to any other unless they co-correlate to a continuous, indivisible element that comprises them.

That said, would you agree there is a distinction between delivering n bits of information and knowing you’re delivering n bits of information?

If so, ”knowing” must be a supra-numeric phenomenon, no?

From a Zen koan, "Stone Mind":

Hogen, a Chinese Zen teacher, lived alone in a small temple in the country. One day four traveling monks appeared and asked if they might make a fire in his yard to warm themselves.

While they were building the fire, Hogen heard them arguing about subjectivity and objectivity. He joined them and said: "There is a big stone. Do you consider it to be inside or outside your mind?"

One of the monks replied: "From the Buddhist viewpoint everything is an objectification of mind, so I would say that the stone is inside my mind."

"Your head must feel very heavy," observed Hogen, "if you are carrying around a stone like that in your mind."

 

From a Zen koan, "Stone Mind":

Hogen, a Chinese Zen teacher, lived alone in a small temple in the country. One day four traveling monks appeared and asked if they might make a fire in his yard to warm themselves.

While they were building the fire, Hogen heard them arguing about subjectivity and objectivity. He joined them and said: "There is a big stone. Do you consider it to be inside or outside your mind?"

One of the monks replied: "From the Buddhist viewpoint everything is an objectification of mind, so I would say that the stone is inside my mind."

"Your head must feel very heavy," observed Hogen, "if you are carrying around a stone like that in your mind."

Haha.

Well, the very concept of physics is also first in the mind, or you couldn’t cognize nor discuss the weight of the stone without its reference point.

The stone first exists in the space of the mind (and this is part of the developing lexical framework) as an energetic “thought form state” where you can “manifest” any kind stones of variable weight, and other metrics, overlap them, and assign them all the properties of the external observable world (really, another mind of sorts) while keeping them addressable.

It’s why humanity is intrigued with “Superman” because it speaks to this phenomenon. In the mind, the weight of the stone is not a function of the mass whatosever. With your eyes closed, both in your conscious and dream states, “You” can pick it up regardless of its weight, and interactively feel the difference, because the mass and weight are mathematical phenomena, and math is about functions, functions are programs, and ultimately the weight and stone are also programs to relate as they are “in the real world.” If the variables could be changed, the functions would behave differently. The origin of all tech is in the mind, and its tech is more sophisiticated than anything observable outside it!

I maintain that the brain, nor any other bit-processing machine of any level couldn’t care less about any of this whatsoever. There is neither stone nor weight nor its “weight in space” in the bit-processing machine that is the brain, or it would have to show up “as described” in a CT scan. None of it is observationally to be found there.

I argue, and what part of the point is of this discourse is: the stone in the mind is “made” of a “lower resolution” substance of the one outside the mind, the basis of “what we deem real.” The “thought stone” and “real stone” has infinite points and a unique wave signature. A bit-processing device is uncapable of identifying any dimensional “thing” unless there’s a distinction between the bits and what the bits represent, because it doesn’t know it exists or where it even is in time and space without an external phenomenon delineating the “information it delivers.”

More heresy:
A machine can make a human-prgrammed numeric difference between signal and noise only because a living human tells it to. Because what we call “meaning” is the difference, and meaning can only exists when a differentiation mechanism is there. That differentiation mechanism must transcend the bits themselves, because this only occurs in a person, not machine; and another part of the discourse is a “definition for life” that transcends dead or undead machinery, because science’s definition for man under a naturalistic paradigm is “machine” through and through, and that’s why it’s constipated, to paraphrase Tesla: “The day science begins to study non-physical phenomena, it will make more progress in 1 day than all its history.”

In my estimation, perhaps we could follow him and his forefather Newton, both of whom gave us the most out of science by starting with an open mind to avoiding the dogma of an exclusively naturalistic viewpoint? It was very obvious to them both. It is for me, personally. I think we can do it objectively without invoking any religion, and that’s my angle. It takes the development of a solid lexical framework that can define and interrelate these abstractions without being in church or a psychward.

 

Would you agree there are 3 distinct elements in the above scenario:

1) The bits
2) The wave
3) The dog

...also, by “3D dog,” I meant the dog exists with 3 dimensional metrics, as in an x, y, and z component within space. Does that work?

Language makes this stuff tricky, so let me say this. The following applies to every statement I've ever made and will ever make:

The actual properties of the universe -- including how anything exists (or doesn't) -- is not directly knowable by humans; all we have is sensory data and an inner voice. We use this sensory data to make models of experience. Sometimes these models are so successful that we forget that they're models and treat them as the real thing.

Space is a prime example. We have no idea what space (the "container of things") is like, but very long ago we found a nice 3D model to describe it. This model has been so successful that we forget that concepts such as length, distance, and angle are properties of our model, not properties of space. The model is good enough to keep us alive when we drive a car down the highway, but what we think we see is not what's actually happening. We know this because we have other, incompatible yet more accurate models of space, and they paint a very different picture than the 3D grid we take for granted as real.

So, when you ask if the dog exists in three dimensions, if taken literally, the only possible answer is "probably not". However, given a model, we can answer the question. For example, under a Newtonian model (which we might call the common-sense model), the dog is an object in 3D space. Under general relativity, the dog is an object in 4D space.

As long as we're mindful of the model being used in the discourse, we can speak cogently. The obvious question, then, is what model should we be assuming? Ideally, we'd choose the most accurate models available to us, but such models bring with them a ton of technical baggage that would likely be a hindrance to discussion. I propose that our assumed, background model is the common-sense Newtonian universe. When we run into problems with the model, we can explicitly switch to a more appropriate model in that context. If you're ok with this, then . . .

I agree that there are three distinct elements in our scenario: the bits (information), the light wave (carrier), and the dog (source of information). The dog is a 3D object that occupies some volume in \( \mathbb{R}^3 \).

 

If the information reflecting the dog’s existence isn’t separate from the dog, what justification do we have to say the information reflects the dog as independent of it?

What is differentiating between bits of signal and bits of noise as relating to the existence of the dog as a cognizable form?
The bits comprising any existing model in our brain are the camera trying to take a photo of itself with no camera here.

If there’s no indivisible differentiator mechanism, we don’t actually exist and neither does the discussion about it, any more than two phones running an app and texting each other exist and talk about it.

Because science, or “to know” has got to logically be the very distinction.

Or what’s the difference between “Siri’s” “referencing” of the dog and yours and mine? If Siri had a 3D holoscreen, or even body, with the data of IBM’s watson, she still doesn’t know what the dog is.

One could say mankind is Siri, and doesn’t really exist, sure. But some part of it has to somewhere, or the conclusion is a contraptional:

01000101 01111000 01101001 01110011 01110100 01100101 01101110 01100011 01100101 00100000 01100100 01101111 01100101 01110011 01101110 00011001 01110100 00100000 01100101 01111000 01101001 01110011 01110100 00101110

Yes?

(For the record, I believe we have token senses to differentiate from sensors for this reason: senses are form-based, sensors are not; the former we’re endeavoring to triangulate here)

 

From your brain’s perspective, why is the dog not in the brain, but the image of it is? What’s endowing the partiality?

I would describe it like this: the light waves carry information about the dog to the retina, which transforms the information into the kind the brain can directly use. Once in the dog information is in the brain, certain processing circuits within the brain cause a coherent image of the dog to be formed, other processing circuits cause an emotional response to the image, and yet other circuits deal with storage. Information about the dog -- not the dog itself -- is what spurred the brain into all this activity.

The dog “outside” the brain assumes it exists “in” something. The brain is in this something as well. How is “space” represented in the brain, if it is the working environment where all that is perceived exists?

The situation is no different than the CCD camera. The camera exists in the same space as the dog insofar as the photosensors can interact with the light reflected from the dog. If the two were not in the same space, then the camera would not detect the dog. The camera "interprets" space by the way it was designed (note how different lens and/or sensor array geometries would lead to different "interpretations" of space). Likewise, the brain interprets space by the way its optical system was designed (evolution). We're wired this way.

I.e., at what point is the correlation happening between the discrete numbers, the continuous wave and “the dog?” If the dog does not exist as an indivisible unitary geometric entity “somewhere, apart from the brain”, how is the information about it even relevant to the brain?

We should make an important distinction between bits, as units of physical information, and numbers, which presumably have no physical existence. Indeed, we can quantify how many bits of information any number requires. They are different kinds of things, and we should respect that distinction.

To your question, the correlation between the dog and the light wave happens at the quantum interface of the two: electrons in the dog's atoms interact with some of the photons in the light, producing new photons at the same frequency of the interacting photon. Thus, the reflected light is correlated in frequency: out of all the (uncorrelated) frequencies in the incoming light, the frequencies in the reflected light are completely correlated to the dog.

A portion of the reflected light strikes our retina, where photoreceptors convert the light energy to the voltage impulses our brains know how to use. As the retina is filled with different kinds of photoreceptors, some of which respond only to certain frequencies, the frequency correlations that tied the light wave to the dog get transferred to the brain. Thus, information is passed from dog to light to brain.

If the wave is not the dog itself, and neither are the bits, the wave and the bits are nondescript entities without this “thing” they’re referencing as the “knowable” actuality.

The wave, as a carrier of information, is a physical phenomenon. We can study waves qua waves without recourse or reference to dog reflections or anything else. Likewise, bits, as abstractions of information, are independent of any referent. Two bits of this is isomorphic (within the category of information) to two bits of that. This is an incredibly useful way to reason about information.

That said, do you draw a distinction between the thought form that is the dog and the physical entity that is the dog?

Of course. The thought form of the dog (a pattern of synaptic voltages) is built from information derived from the physical dog (an atomic pattern, in our common-sense model).

This hearkens to my original question concerning the cube. It exists as a 3D object with hard corners. Without the ability to first identify the object in the mind’s eye, there’s no ability to identify it in physical space separate from the brain.

It seems like you're suggesting that we can't see what we don't know, but this seems obviously wrong. How is the process bootstrapped? Does a toddler not see a cube until it's told what it is?

To “know” is obviously then different than to “deliver n bits of information” as if the brain is a dumb terminal hooked up to a hard drive. No subset of the n bits is intrinsically tied to any other unless they co-correlate to a continuous, indivisible element that comprises them.

That said, would you agree there is a distinction between delivering n bits of information and knowing you’re delivering n bits of information?

"To know" is ill-defined; we can't answer if someone "knows" a thing until we define what knowing a thing means. I'm not sure what you're getting at here. What does knowing have to do with physical processes? Does the camera know it received information? (See why I keep insisting that brains/minds are a needless complication?)

 

Or what’s the difference between “Siri’s” “referencing” of the dog and yours and mine? If Siri had a 3D holoscreen, or even body, with the data of IBM’s watson, she still doesn’t know what the dog is.

What makes you think that we know what the dog is? Just as the camera CCD dumbly captures an image of a dog, so do our brains. The information about the dog is information about the physical state of space at that time, and our brain's image is a representation of that space state. Nothing more.

(For the record, I believe we have token senses to differentiate from sensors for this reason: senses are form-based, sensors are not; the former we’re endeavoring to triangulate here)

Our only inputs are sensors, no different in kind than the photodiodes in the CCD array. Our sense of sight or smell is just the processed aggregate of our individual sensors. It is precisely the same as the camera, which aggregates and processes its individual sensors to create a bitmap, the "form".

 

What makes you think that we know what the dog is? Just as the camera CCD dumbly captures an image of a dog, so do our brains. The information about the dog is information about the physical state of space at that time, and our brain's image is a representation of that space state. Nothing more.

How do we know what the first sentence is even referring to if you don't know what the dog is?

We have a lot of explaining to do as to how smoke signals yields a person.

I feel you have a partiality to "non-existence" as the framework.

If you want to use a mathematical model to describe everything, is not any model essentially groups of nondescript bits? With no differentiation, are we not the model itself?

A person's brain receives the information about the dog and files the bits within itself in whatever areas it wants.

Assume we can take the person's brain out while they're still "alive" and put it on a table and cut it up into several sections.

What do we have?

Merely groups of bits in the brain representing the dog-like sequence. Even if there are circuits that handle an experiential in-tandem event, there is no "one" anywhere experiencing it. In my estimation, we have a token called "who" to distinguish between "what" for a reason, because no one (or indivisibly identifiable thing) is home amidst the "what" of the code, if the code is doubling as the who.

There is no indivisible you "who" unit of existence anywhere to be found.

Where do you disagree here?

 

How do we know what the first sentence is even referring to if you don't know what the dog is?

Again, as you have not defined what it means to "know", I cannot answer the question.

In my view, the condition of knowing something is a big, complicated abstraction with many layers of connotation. "You know your friends, but do you really know them?" Etc.

None of this "knowing" stuff is necessary to accurately describe the transmission and storage of information. Here's a heuristic that can help us along: If the question you ask cannot also be asked of a camera, then it's not a well-posed question.

I feel you have a partiality to "non-existence" as the framework.

I don't know what you mean by this. The framework is the model, yes? Then I believe things can exist in models; indeed, I'm partial to models that have things in them.

If you want to use a mathematical model to describe everything, is not any model essentially groups of nondescript bits? With no differentiation, are we not the model itself?

Choosing a model means choosing a logical system (the rules) and applying semantics (the meaning) to the system. For example, in physics we typically model motion using differential equations. The equations are a mathematical model of a physical phenomenon. Choosing a different set of equations gives us a different model (different semantics). In no sense is the model the phenomenon; they are always distinct.

Assume we can take the person's brain out while they're still "alive" and put it on a table and cut it up into several sections.

What do we have? Groups of bits in the brain representing the dog-like sequence. Even if there are circuits that handle an experiential in-tandem event, we have a token called "who" to distinguish between "what" for a reason, because no one (or indivisibly identifiable thing) is home amidst the code, if the code is also the who.

There is no indivisible you "who" unit of existence anywhere in the description.

Where do you disagree here?

I don't understand your emphasis on pronouns. Using the heuristic mentioned above, if I take the CCD chip out of the camera, keep it powered so that it's "alive", what happens? The sensors in the CCD continue to respond to light, but without the rest of the camera circuitry, that's the end of the line -- no bitmaps are produced.