https://agelesslinux.org/map.html

 

https://agelesslinux.org/map.html

This is troubling:

Apple and Google already comply. The 600+ volunteer Linux distributions cannot. The compliance cost is zero for trillion-dollar platform companies and prohibitive for community projects. Both models passed with overwhelming bipartisan support. Both were supported by the major platform companies.

This is not a coincidence. This is a compliance moat.

The EFF calls this pattern "a windfall for Big Tech and a death sentence for smaller platforms."

 

This is troubling:

Apple and Google already comply. The 600+ volunteer Linux distributions cannot. The compliance cost is zero for trillion-dollar platform companies and prohibitive for community projects. Both models passed with overwhelming bipartisan support. Both were supported by the major platform companies.

This is not a coincidence. This is a compliance moat.

The EFF calls this pattern "a windfall for Big Tech and a death sentence for smaller platforms."

Let them try to enforce it.

 

Let them try to enforce it.

it's unrealistic and unenforceable, of course ... but concerning, nevertheless ...

 

 

https://www.cnn.com/2026/04/08/china/china-supercomputer-hackers-hnk-intl

Now they know how it feels.

 

US bans new foreign-made consumer internet routers

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"Malicious actors have exploited security gaps in foreign-made routers to attack American households, disrupt networks, enable espionage, and facilitate intellectual property theft," the FCC said.

 

US bans new foreign-made consumer internet routers
View attachment 365984​

"The ban stems from growing concern over the last year that routers were a point of easy-access for malicious actors."

This has been known for at least 25 years.

I know this, because that is how long I've been building and running my own routers. On purpose.

 

The Government Doesn’t Just Want to Ban Ghost Guns. It Wants to Control Your 3D Printer


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New laws are targeting not just 3D-printed weapons, but the digital files, platforms, and machines that create them, raising questions about innovation and who decides what can be made.

 

The Government Doesn’t Just Want to Ban Ghost Guns. It Wants to Control Your 3D Printer
View attachment 366828
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Colorado’s HB26-1144, on its way to the governor for his signature, takes a more direct route, criminalizing the manufacture of certain firearms and parts using 3D printing.

Actually, Colorado HB26-1144 goes even further than that, because the first thing it does is: "The act defines 3-dimensional printing to mean additive and subtractive manufacturing." Subtractive manufacturing is what you do with things like mills and lathes.

The notion of requiring printers to be able to detect that the current part being printed is part of a firearm is absurd at first blush.

And the cat is SO out of the bag!

You can build a 3D printer from scratch and the software to run it is already in the wild.

And people have been making zip-guns for the better part of a century using materials that are lying around most homes.

 

Ban the plumbing department.

 

"The ban stems from growing concern over the last year that routers were a point of easy-access for malicious actors."

This has been known for at least 25 years.

I know this, because that is how long I've been building and running my own routers. On purpose.

That's fine. For you. But telling my stepmother that she has to build and run her own router is not a viable solution to the problem.

 

That's fine. For you. But telling my stepmother that she has to build and run her own router is not a viable solution to the problem.

I can only do what's best for me, my business, and my personal friends, family, and associates.

I cannot save the world.

 

https://www.404media.co/hackers-sim...to-high-profile-instagram-accounts-it-worked/

Hackers Simply Asked Meta AI to Give Them Access to High-Profile Instagram Accounts. It Worked

 

https://www.benthamsgaze.org/2026/0...-decoding-nineteen-years-of-gps-cryptography/

A random sequence in an innocuous GPS message field is likely encrypted traffic from the U.S. military's system for remotely updating cryptographic keys around the world.

 

https://9to5mac.com/2026/06/18/new-unpatchable-exploit-targets-apple-devices-with-a12-and-a13-chips/
New unpatchable exploit targets Apple devices with A12 and A13 chips

In a highly detailed technical post published today, the Paradigm Shift Team details usbliter8, a new exploit that “leverages both a hardware bug in the USB controller and a specific configuration flaw present in the device firmware” and cannot be patched.

The PS Team explains that ahead of today’s disclosure, it shared its findings and worked with Apple Product Security to coordinate the release. The researchers also thanked Apple’s security team for its “prompt response, constructive engagement, and cooperation throughout” the process.

In a nutshell, this bug affects the following Apple SoCs: A12, S4, S5, and A13. Althrough the authors only explicitly mention the iPhone in their write-up, these are the devices equipped with these SoCs:

• A12: iPhone XR, iPhone XS/XS Max, iPad Air 3, iPad mini 5, iPad 8, and second-generation Apple TV 4K
• S4: Apple Watch Series 4
• S5: Apple Watch Series 5, first-generation Apple Watch SE, and HomePod mini
• A13: iPhone 11/11 Pro/11 Pro Max, second-generation iPhone SE, iPad 9, and Studio Display

They add that “technical support for A12X/Z is possible,” but “it is not currently implemented.” That could add the 2018 and 2020 iPad Pro lineups to the list.

 

https://9to5mac.com/2026/06/18/new-unpatchable-exploit-targets-apple-devices-with-a12-and-a13-chips/
New unpatchable exploit targets Apple devices with A12 and A13 chips

In a highly detailed technical post published today, the Paradigm Shift Team details usbliter8, a new exploit that “leverages both a hardware bug in the USB controller and a specific configuration flaw present in the device firmware” and cannot be patched.

The PS Team explains that ahead of today’s disclosure, it shared its findings and worked with Apple Product Security to coordinate the release. The researchers also thanked Apple’s security team for its “prompt response, constructive engagement, and cooperation throughout” the process.

In a nutshell, this bug affects the following Apple SoCs: A12, S4, S5, and A13. Althrough the authors only explicitly mention the iPhone in their write-up, these are the devices equipped with these SoCs:

• A12: iPhone XR, iPhone XS/XS Max, iPad Air 3, iPad mini 5, iPad 8, and second-generation Apple TV 4K
• S4: Apple Watch Series 4
• S5: Apple Watch Series 5, first-generation Apple Watch SE, and HomePod mini
• A13: iPhone 11/11 Pro/11 Pro Max, second-generation iPhone SE, iPad 9, and Studio Display

They add that “technical support for A12X/Z is possible,” but “it is not currently implemented.” That could add the 2018 and 2020 iPad Pro lineups to the list.

It sounds like the flaw originated from one of the most common development errors -- assuming that everyone is going to obey the spec, including the bad guys. They assumed that because the spec says that the payload must always be exactly eight bytes, that the bad guys are somehow bound by the spec and will therefore always supply exactly eight byte payloads.

 

as the saying goes ... "Assumption is the mother of all screw-ups" ...

 

Hardware design flaws in production is the nightmare.

 

Hardware design flaws in production is the hightmare.

Yep. It's a Gordian knot of pros and cons. What features do you put in hardware and which in software/firmware. Some of the choices are obvious, but many of them can be done either way. From a security standpoint, hardware implementations are fixed and immutable. The bad guys have to operate with what it is, so the designer has the potential to really lock down the attack surface. But the good guys have to live with whatever that attack surface turns out to be.