Saw an interesting piece at navy times concerning this ....


https://www.navytimes.com/news/your...-the-vessel-that-hit-it/#.XD0TxuPCrFM.twitter

I wish I could say that I was shocked and stunned -- and to some degree I am, thought more head-shaking disgust than anything else.

I understand (especially having been there, done that) that there is always a certain sheen of apathy and complacency in any organization, bred in equal parts by frustration at trying to get things fixed for extended periods of time and giving up on ever accomplishing it combined with an acceptance born from having had to figure out ways to get the job done anyway and getting used to doing it that way, even though you know it's technically wrong. I also know that things will never run perfectly in any organization and any overly-aggressive attempts to make them perfect will likely only make them worse. But, despite all of that, the details in that article (assuming they are accurate) paint a picture that goes so far beyond what should have been tolerated by anyone -- and tolerated for way longer than what was by any stretch of the imagination acceptable -- that it is a damning indictment of far, far more than just a few sailors or officers. It reveals systemic problems that need to be addressed. The good news is that the military, far more than most organizations, has a pretty good record of stepping up and dealing with such problems once they get past the pretty-much inevitable automatic, knee-jerk reaction to try to gloss things over to save face for both individuals and the institution.

 

WBahn, I was disgusted. I am more disgusted at the Chief Petty Officers aboard than anything else. While the CPO is subject to NJP. the CO or OIC of a unit can not reduce them in rate (rank). The only way I know a CPO, SCPO, or MCPO, can be reduced is sustained incompetence over two evaluation periods, or by Courts Martial, in the Navy.

 

Saw an interesting piece at navy times concerning this ....


https://www.navytimes.com/news/your...-the-vessel-that-hit-it/#.XD0TxuPCrFM.twitter

All of that might be true but it still doesn't explain the crash other than to say they were incredibly stupid about following basic seamanship. We ran the same straits filled to the brim with every type of ship known to man several times with just watch standers and sound powered microphones to the bridge sans the fancy radar and electronics. Your AN/MK1 eyeball and brain are what's needed with the basic seamanship a boot learns in boot-camp.

 

@nsaspook I agree basic seamanship would have resolved this issue. Training or lack thereof was my first thoughts at the time of the incident. Training is another purview I would lay at the feet of the Chief's Mess.

 

Your AN/MK1 eyeball and brain are what's needed with the basic seamanship a boot learns in boot-camp.

And therein probably lies a big part of the problem -- the Navy has forgotten what a sailor really needs to know to be a sailor in favor of all of the other things that have been pushed down their throats as being so important for so long. It's a pendulum that swings back and forth for all of the branches, probably in all militaries but more so in one like ours that is so much more strongly tied to the people than most. At some point we will remember that the primary role of the military -- far and above any other -- is to able to break things and kill people anywhere, anytime and their primary job when not doing either of those is to be training in the serious and lethal business of honing the skills needed to do so. The Air Force is probably the worst about needing to be reminded of that on a periodic basis; the Navy is historically shielded from it because of the inherently dangerous nature of normal operations of a fleet at sea -- but this certainly shows that it's far from immune.

What was heartbreaking as I read that story was that it was like reading descriptions of the situation in the Soviet military in the years leading up to the fall of the USSR -- I frankly would have never thought I would have read it about a ship of the U.S. Navy.

 

WBahn, I was disgusted. I am more disgusted at the Chief Petty Officers aboard than anything else. While the CPO is subject to NJP. the CO or OIC of a unit can not reduce them in rate (rank). The only way I know a CPO, SCPO, or MCPO, can be reduced is sustained incompetence over two evaluation periods, or by Courts Martial, in the Navy.

Even without knowing the specific dynamics of the Navy, I would have to agree. Throughout history it has been the NCOs (or their equivalent) that have been the backbone of any military. They have the necessary blend of experience, authority, and perspective to see what is important, what it not, and to make things happen one way or another despite any obstacles, including roadblocks put in their path by higher authority, either inside or outside the military. They operate at the level where things are real and the people that they are responsible for die for real if they don't do their jobs. That, as a group, the NCOs on that ship could let conditions get to and stay at that level does not say good things about the overall state of affairs.

 

After I read that, it probably was the nexus for the Loss of Confidence in the MCPO that was relieved.

 

https://www.yahoo.com/gma/navy-drop...on-killed-054009607--abc-news-topstories.html

 

Looks like USN top brass A$$ covering at its finest.

 

Here's an article on how they botched the investigation ... "undue command influence."

 

Here's an article on how they botched the investigation ... "undue command influence."

A botch my a$$. This was a “coordinated message” designed by people (who wrote the book) to poison a case used as a side show to distract the public from seeing years of botched politically correct Navy leadership at the top.

Richardson, they have asserted, targeted these individuals to distract from larger, more systemic failings, failings that had plagued the Navy’s vaunted 7th Fleet for years, and that were exposed for the world to see in two of the deadliest Navy accidents in years.

 

A botch my a$$. This was a “coordinated message” designed by people (who wrote the book) to poison a case used as a side show to distract the public from seeing years of botched politically correct Navy leadership at the top.

“This decision is in the best interest of the Navy..."

That's all one needs to hear. No mention of justice or fact-finding to improve future operations. The only question is how/who defines "the Navy". It clearly means "top brass" in this case.

 

@nsaspook, yeah it was "botched". Once the flags saw their part in the incidents, it was sabotaged from further review. The quickest way to accomplish that task and get this off the front pages is to "exert undue command influence", allowing the lawyers for the accused to get the charges dismissed. A quick pick up the broom and the corner of the rug and commence sweeping operation at its finest.

Whatever happened to the unit commander was responsible for everything? I recall meeting two sailors from the USS Indianapolis, whose CO was courts martialed for hazarding a vessel by not doing the "approved" zig-zag when traveling in known submarine areas. Capt McVey was "pardoned" so to speak, post mortum by WJC. Even the Japanese sub commander testified at his court martial said McVey would not have out maneuvered the sub commander's torpedoes. I still have a difficult time wrapping my head around a court martial for hazarding a vessel in wartime, but that's another topic. The Indianapolis was un-escorted in their last mission, delivering some ordinance to Tinian Island in time for an August delivery. It was un-escorted on their return as well when they were sunk in shark infested waters with a high loss of life, mostly from the sharks. Of the 890 that didn't perish with the ship, 316 survived the shark attacks.