https://nypost.com/2025/01/30/us-ne...-american-airlines-flight-that-crashed-in-dc/

 

Maybe the air traffic controllers made a mistake?

Based on the very limited amount of information available so far, this isn't sounding like it is the case. The helicopter pilot was advised of the traffic (the RJ) and reported that he had the traffic in sight and stated his intentions to steer clear of the RJ visually, which is the usual procedure. The responsibility then shifts to the pilot for collision avoidance and the controller's attention shifts to the rest of the traffic. Furthermore, under VMC (Visual Meteorological Conditions), it is ultimately always the pilot's responsibility to see-and-avoid and to maintain the required separations. The controllers are there to assist them in achieving that. It was less that twenty seconds from the time that the pilot stated that they had the traffic in sight to the collision.

Having said that, one thing that they will be looking at, as far as the controllers go, is whether they should have proactively issued vectors to one (or both) aircraft sooner to steer them away from each other. That may well be the case. I don't know what ATC uses as their threshold before they issue vectors for collision avoidance -- that's going to depend on a lot of factors. In general, they don't like issuing unplanned vectors if they can avoid it because it disrupts the expected flow of traffic, potentially causing a cascade of other changes that can, in turn, create hazardous situations elsewhere. They also prefer that pilots maintain visual separation, when possible, because the view of the situation that controllers have generally isn't as solid as that of the pilot. For aircraft operating in close proximity to each other, their instructions can actually make things worse.

I was almost involved in a midair coming into Colorado Springs on an IFR training flight (so I was under the hood). ATC was asking a King Air if they had us in sight, when the response was negative, they instructed the King Air to make a turn (to their left, IIRC). We were flying level and the King Air was climbing. ATC thought we were both at the same altitude and so they issued the turn instruction to give the King Air more time to get well above us before our paths crossed. Just as they issued the instruction, my instructor spotted the King Air and they were actually below us and the turn would have brought them right into us. He hollered on the radio for the King Air to ignore and maintain course, which they did, passing just behind us by a couple hundred feet and at our altitude. We reported the incident (as we were supposed to). My understanding is that the determination was that the controller got too fixated on trying to direct the King Air pilot's attention on where to look for us and should have abandoned that effort and issued vectors sooner.

Flying at night in a heavily populated area with significant air traffic is extremely challenging. Seeing and identifying the airport's beacons can be tricky, let alone the lights on another aircraft against a background of lights, many of which are the same color and are also flashing and moving. It's also extremely difficult to judge distance. This makes it fairly easy to look in the direction of the reported traffic and see a different aircraft that is somewhat further away and slightly off to the side and believe that that is the aircraft that you were being advised about. One thing that the NTSB will be looking at are the positions of other aircraft at that time to determine if there are other aircraft that could have been misidentified.

On a cloudless night with a new moon, it is particularly difficult to see aircraft that are at your same altitude over a crowded city. The aircraft isn't occluding the city lights, like it might if it were below you, and it's not reflecting the city lights from the bottom of its fuselage and wings, like it might if it's above you. Having an overcast sky can get enough reflected city light to provide some general illumination, but with no clouds, there just isn't much to work with.

If I had to guess right now, I would say that it most likely comes down to the helicopter pilot's failure to maintain visual separation (something that they specifically requested) as the primary cause with the controller not issuing proactive collision avoidance vectors as a contributing factor.

 

It was less that twenty seconds from the time that the pilot stated that they had the traffic in sight to the collision.

This may be a major factor*.

How long does it take to affirmatively identify such a target under those conditions (especially considering possible pilot overload due to heavy congestion in that area)?

Further, is there a 2nd officer in the helicopter cockpit that would have been assisting with traffic/operation of the helicopter?

*Edit: Trump was referring to this in his press conference today. I suspect he wouldn't have mentioned it if someone didn't indicate to him that it was a likely contributing factor.

 

 

OMG, Heartbreaking!! Where those helo (“Priority Air Travel” PAT25) guys wearing night-vision goggles (seems unlikely over a bright city)? There have been horrible accidents in the past where restricted vision (with poor field of depth) was a factor. The swiss-cheese really lined up for that crash.

 

 

I think my WAG was correct:

1) Helo pilot had his eyes closed (night vision);
2) Helo pilot mistook target aircraft.

I'll also add: late warning from ATC.

Why did Helo climb to 300ft? Regardless, 100 feet of separation is hairy.

 

My impression is that the helo possibly thought the CRJ being referred to was the one ahead of the incident aircraft. (i.e., they saw JIA5307 but the controller was talking about JIA5342).

This is the trace at the time that the tower advised the helicopter that they had traffic a CRJ just south of a bridge. Notice that both aircraft are CRJs and each is just south of a bridge. At night it can be very difficult to distinguish one bridge from another -- you just see traffic head/tail lights crossing a line of blackness (the river). Given that the helo immediately requested visual separation, they probably already had the lead CRJ in sight and assumed that that was the aircraft being called out. They were told to pass behind it, which they proceeded to do. When the controller called out again, they knew they were well past the CRJ (which had actually already landed, but they probably didn't know that because it was no longer a factor and they knew they would pass easily behind it). When the controller asked again if they had the CRJ in sight, they might have still thought it was the plane they had already passed that was being asked about. At this point, the pilot probably should have realized that the controller wouldn't be asking about an aircraft that was no longer a factor and, to be on the safe side, declared that they did not have them in sight. The controller possibly could have then given them instructions that would have avoided the collision. Maybe. At that point, time had almost run out.

 

My impression is that the helo possibly thought the CRJ being referred to was the one ahead of the incident aircraft. (i.e., they saw JIA5307 but the controller was talking about JIA5342).

This is the trace at the time that the tower advised the helicopter that they had traffic a CRJ just south of a bridge. Notice that both aircraft are CRJs and each is just south of a bridge. At night it can be very difficult to distinguish one bridge from another -- you just see traffic head/tail lights crossing a line of blackness (the river). Given that the helo immediately requested visual separation, they probably already had the lead CRJ in sight and assumed that that was the aircraft being called out. They were told to pass behind it, which they proceeded to do. When the controller called out again, they knew they were well past the CRJ (which had actually already landed, but they probably didn't know that because it was no longer a factor and they knew they would pass easily behind it). When the controller asked again if they had the CRJ in sight, they might have still thought it was the plane they had already passed that was being asked about. At this point, the pilot probably should have realized that the controller wouldn't be asking about an aircraft that was no longer a factor and, to be on the safe side, declared that they did not have them in sight. The controller possibly could have then given them instructions that would have avoided the collision. Maybe. At that point, time had almost run out.

View attachment 341595

I think the bottom line is: just too much damn traffic for such a small operating area.

 

My impression is that the helo possibly thought the CRJ being referred to was the one ahead of the incident aircraft. (i.e., they saw JIA5307 but the controller was talking about JIA5342).

This is the trace at the time that the tower advised the helicopter that they had traffic a CRJ just south of a bridge. Notice that both aircraft are CRJs and each is just south of a bridge. At night it can be very difficult to distinguish one bridge from another -- you just see traffic head/tail lights crossing a line of blackness (the river). Given that the helo immediately requested visual separation, they probably already had the lead CRJ in sight and assumed that that was the aircraft being called out. They were told to pass behind it, which they proceeded to do. When the controller called out again, they knew they were well past the CRJ (which had actually already landed, but they probably didn't know that because it was no longer a factor and they knew they would pass easily behind it). When the controller asked again if they had the CRJ in sight, they might have still thought it was the plane they had already passed that was being asked about. At this point, the pilot probably should have realized that the controller wouldn't be asking about an aircraft that was no longer a factor and, to be on the safe side, declared that they did not have them in sight. The controller possibly could have then given them instructions that would have avoided the collision. Maybe. At that point, time had almost run out.

View attachment 341595

Damn, the swiss cheese does sometimes align at the worst possible moment in time.

 

Damn, the swiss cheese does sometimes align at the worst possible moment in time.

View attachment 341597

All JIA5342 had to do was not change its initial approach, and it'd just be another uneventful flight.

Final Destination vibes.

 

All JIA5342 had to do was not change its initial approach, and it'd just be another uneventful flight.

Final Destination vibes.

For sure ...

 

I think the bottom line is: just too much damn traffic for such a small operating area.

It doesn't look like there was that much traffic at all at the time of the incident -- which is to be expected at that time in the evening. Small, uncontrolled airports often have more traffic than what was shown on the track and relying on pilot self-announcements to deconflict traffic. If flown into such airports with eight to ten aircraft in the pattern doing touch-and-go landings intermixed with full-stops in addition to transiting aircraft.

 

 

Look at Vegas airport, pretty slow now but starting fridays for the weekend, OMG
https://www.airnavradar.com/@36.08899,-115.15083,z13

 

 

My strong suspicion is still that the helo crew was watching the wrong aircraft without realizing it. The CVR might give enough hints for the NTSB to determine if that was the case and perhaps which aircraft they were actually looking at.

I don't think it was the plane that was taking off. My bet, currently, is on it being the CRJ that was ahead of them.

 

According to a local area chart that was shown briefly on the news, it looked like the helicopter ceiling in that area was 200 ft. The radar tracks seem to indicate that the collision occurred at about 300 ft. But radar altitude indications do not translate directly to actual altitudes. So this raises two questions: What was the actual altitude that the helicopter was flying at? If it was above 200 ft (assuming that my brief glimpse of the chart is correct), why were they above the ceiling in that area? The answer to that last question could be that they had been assigned a higher altitude by ATC within the DCA Class B airspace, but my guess is that this would already have come out had that been the case.

 

My strong suspicion is still that the helo crew was watching the wrong aircraft without realizing it. The CVR might give enough hints for the NTSB to determine if that was the case and perhaps which aircraft they were actually looking at.

I don't think it was the plane that was taking off. My bet, currently, is on it being the CRJ that was ahead of them.

IMO If they had stayed below the 200ft limit it shouldn't matter what aircraft they saw or even flew above them. Military helo's have been flying this exact same route for decades.

 

IMO If they had stayed below the 200ft limit it shouldn't matter what aircraft they saw or even flew above them. Military helo's have been flying this exact same route for decades.

Agreed. Though, again, this assumes that the information on the flight tracking sites reflects actual altitudes. If the data is derived off the aircraft's transponder, then it is probably pressure altitude. If the helo was just below 200', the pressure altitude would only have needed to be a little over 50' higher to register as 300' on the display. Roughly, a one inch change in barometric pressure translates to a one thousand foot change in pressure altitude (near the surface). So that would have only required a difference of 0.05". To show as a higher altitude, the surface pressure would have to be lower, so instead of 29.92" Hg, a pressure of 29.87" Hg could account for it.

Here's the METAR data for KDCA (Reagan International) from around the time of the collision:



The collision occurred at 8:48 pm, so the latest METAR was the 1952L report which had the altimeter setting as 29.87" Hg. But it was closer to 29.90". The pressure appears to have been rising pretty steadily throughout the afternoon and evening.

I don't know if there is a site that we can access historical ATIS information to see what setting the pilot was given when they were cleared into the Class B. If they were given an altimeter setting when they entered and were flying based on that setting, then if the actual pressure increases their altimeter would read a lower altitude, causing them to physically move up in response. This is not an issue as long as all aircraft in the area are using the same altimeter settings, which in Class B is pretty much assured.

Based on this, I think it very possible that the helicopter was operating below the ceiling based on indicated altitude (which is what counts), but their pressure altitude might have been above it.

So no screaming red flags here, but I'm sure it is something the NTSB is going to look closely at (and using much better data than I have).