A failed sensor caused 2 modern aircraft to nosedive into the ground killing everyone on board?

Yes.
The part I can't fathom, is that there were two identical sensors for this, but the software was designed to respond to only one.
Why on earth would they design it that way, and why would everyone, both at Boeing and the FAA, approve such a scheme when redundancy was available to readily mitigate such a single-point failure (especially when that sensor is known to occasionally fail from ground damage or bird strikes)?
I don't even see that as a significant cost issue, so all that's left is group stupidity.
Many heads should roll at both Boeing and the FAA for such gross negligence that killed 346 people (but they likely won't).
The typical institutional response to such a failure to "search for the guilty and punish the innocent".

 

Yes.
The part I can't fathom, is that, there were two identical sensors for this, but the software was designed to respond to only one.

I still will never understand why anyone would approve an automation to the flight controls that can not be overpowered by the pilots. After all, the PIC has the final responsibility for the safety of the flight, not some computer tucked away in the electronics bay.

Any computer commanded trim input should be overrideable by the electric trim switch on the yoke. If there is not one there, put one there. Or grabbing the trim wheel should stop the trim motion in its tracks.

Can you imagine a cruise control on a car that disables the drivers ability to brake?

 

Can you imagine a cruise control on a car that disables the drivers ability to brake?

Or doesn't shut off the throttle when you brake (which is apparently what has caused some Toyota accidents)?

 

Or doesn't shut off the throttle when you brake (which is apparently what has caused some Toyota accidents)?

The guy that designed the Toyota cruise control left and went to work at Boeing?

 

It's been at least 2 months since the 737 has been officially grounded by the FAA and other regulatory agencies in other countries and the news hasn't released any information about when it will be placed back in service.

So, I'm guessing that there is no workable fix and the 737 Max will wind up becoming a batch of aluminum scrap.

 

I would guess the fix was developed rather quickly. But another federal agency has been shown to be incompetent.

So, the approval of the fix will be slow, to show deliberation, and possibly more training requirements to be phased in. It will be over-reach. More and tighter regulations is the repentance the agency must do.

This always happens when the hen house guard dog becomes social with the fox.

Sorta like the press becoming social with the government. It enables each others' incompetence.

 

It's been at least 2 months since the 737 has been officially grounded by the FAA and other regulatory agencies in other countries and the news hasn't released any information about when it will be placed back in service.

So, I'm guessing that there is no workable fix and the 737 Max will wind up becoming a batch of aluminum scrap.

I doubt that will be the case ... a faulty sensor (and its software) cannot possible justify scrapping an entire product/design

 

Sorta like the press becoming social with the government. It enables each others' incompetence.

I thought you were a loyal Fox News Chanel guy?

 

I doubt that will be the case ... a faulty sensor (and its software) cannot possible justify scrapping an entire product/design

[I am taking a risk here of posting without reading this whole long thread, ignore me if this has already been covered in detail]

If you read the original article that started this thread, you would understand that the problem is not just a faulty sensor and software. The problem is that the aircraft is inherently unstable after the changes were made to fit the new engines. When the nose is pitched up too high, the plane responds by pitching it up more. This is positive feedback, which, as electronics people know is unstable. So, to fly it safely the pilot has to counter this tendency to pitch up and run away and stall. Normally, there should be negative feedback, which makes the problem somewhat self correcting.

Bob

 

[I am taking a risk here of posting without reading this whole long thread, ignore me if this has already been covered in detail]

If you read the original article that started this thread, you would understand that the problem is not just a faulty sensor and software. The problem is that the aircraft is inherently unstable after the changes were made to fit the new engines. When the nose is pitched up too high, the plane responds by pitching it up more. This is positive feedback, which, as electronics people know is unstable. So, to fly it safely the pilot has to counter this tendency to pitch up and run away and stall. Normally, there should be negative feedback, which makes the problem somewhat self correcting.

Bob

Yes, you took the risk and failed. The original article was total BS.

 

Yes, you took the risk and failed. The original article was total BS.

 

These planes crashed because of poor engineering of a very common flight system, poor product safety training management and senior management stupidity, not poor aerodynamics. Without MCAS (a automatic trim control system, not a anti-stall system) these planes would be flying safely as a aerodynamically stable aircraft but would need a new type certification for pilots but because the engine placement and power increases changed the stick 'feel' of the aircraft at the limits of control.

 

The original article was total BS.

Nsa, can you bullet-point the total BS that you're talking about? I'm not doubting what you're saying, I'd just like to have a clearer view of what went wrong. That is, if you have the time, of course.

 

Nsa, can you bullet-point the total BS that you're talking about? I'm not doubting what you're saying, I'd just like to have a clearer view of what went wrong. That is, if you have the time, of course.

This is the primary and often repeated BS 'fact' from that article.

It doesn’t need to be ‘fixed’ with more complexity, more software. It needs to be removed, altogether. (Travis is sharing his evaluation as a Google Doc, located here.)
...
"Baffling" decisions
In an interview, Travis said “the most baffling thing to me is how this possibly could have happened” to a commercial aircraft with a long history of safety and reliability and built by a company with a sterling reputation for hardware engineering

Travis is unequivocal in his assessment of the Boeing 737 MAX. “It’s a faulty airframe. You’ve got to fix the airframe [and] you can’t fix the airframe without moving the engines” back and away from their current position.
...
EE Times provided Boeing a PDF-format copy of Travis’s analysis of the 737 MAX design and his conclusion that the manufacturer proposed to solve an airframe problem with MCAS as a less expensive way to achieve federal certification.

Someone who uses 737 flight simulators (Gregory Travis) VS a real Boeing 737 pilot (Juan Browne 'Blancolirio' and others) with real lives on the line saying "the 737 MAX is an inherently stable design" but MCAS is a POS.

10:20

Which one is likely to understand the flight characteristic of the 737 MAX? The core problem was a MCAS induced runaway trim condition causing the aircraft to nosedive at 500mph. The problem is with Boeing's implementation of MCAS. The software system only activates in very specific high angle of attack condition not normally seen during normal flight operations. Normal activation would be rare unless there is a sensor failure like in the two crashes.

 

The problem is with Boeing's implementation of MCAS.

That's my understanding as well. Thanks for posting.

 

A update on the Russian 'SuperJet' crash.
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019...ent-wrong-with-the-sukhoi-superjet-100-a65553
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019...superjet-flights-following-fatal-crash-a65850

 

The 737 MAX being 'fixed' at
Boeing Field, Renton factory

 

More than 400 pilots sue Boeing in Class Action

https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-...4/more-400-max-pilots-sue-boeing-class-action

 

More than 400 pilots use Boeing in Class Action

https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-...4/more-400-max-pilots-sue-boeing-class-action

Good luck with that. “Psychological impact”? OK, stop being a pilot and start washing dishes.