He makes the point quite powerfully that the air-frame was not at fault.

It was his delivery. Just horrible.

 

It was his delivery. Just horrible.

Most sensible people can easily get past that. The guy is a professional pilot not a professional actor that plays one on Youtube.

 

anytime you provide an override, you reduce the reliability of the system

Same is true of seatbelts. You get that annoying alarm when you sit down and don't buckle your seatbelt. That's why my dad used to keep the seatbelt buckled. When he got in the car it was already buckled and he didn't have to use it.

Ultimately, it will be paying air travelers who decide on the fate of Boeing.

Same was true of the fate of the DC-10. The Mexico crash seemed to seal the fate of the jet, but trust me, landing ANY jet liner on a dump truck is not going to end well. It was all about the media and the public perception that flying on a DC-10 was inherently risky. Back then the 747 was known to have a high number of in flight warnings for components that were going into failure. Fortunately for the traveling public and for Boeing is that there were few crashes. I think there were a few. If the Lockerbie incident were a DC-10 and not a 747 the public would have concluded the plane was unsafe when blown in half. But for the fate of Boeing, it was a bomber who brought the plane down and not a design issue.

It seems all the pilot had to do to re-stabilize the aircraft from the MCAS induced trim errors was to pull the STAB TRIM breakers/switches. Per the link this was already the stated procedure for a runaway stabilizer.

When you're suddenly confronted with a confusing and rapidly developing situation, finding switches and breakers is not an easy task. Especially when there are so many switches and breakers a pilot needs to be familiar with. Let alone what happens when you shut something off. It takes rational thinking; and if you're in a life & death situation suddenly and almost inexplicably, rational thought kind of goes out the window.

He makes the point quite powerfully that the air-frame was not at fault.

There's nothing wrong with my car. Except maybe a loose nut behind the wheel.

I just discovered this category of threads. I find it interesting, and am jumping into this one quite late. Nevertheless, I have to agree that a big problem with the FAA giving this aircraft a certificate to operate possibly has a lot to do with lobbying. They say everyone has a price. And if you're willing to pony up enough cash, suddenly it becomes easy to rationalize that disaster is unlikely, therefore go ahead and accept the cash and approve the plane.

The 737 has never been one of my Aircraft Of Choice (AOC). In many landing experiences the plane seemed to descend like a leaf falling from a tree. Swings like a pendulum on approach. The T-Tail aircraft I've flown on seem to be more stable, having engines mounted on the fuselage seems, in my opinion, to be more stable because the stabilizer is not riding in the vortex generated by the wings.

The whole thing stinks of "Capitalism". Just my opinion. The rich get richer and the poor (us slobs) get pooched.

 

..
When you're suddenly confronted with a confusing and rapidly developing situation, finding switches and breakers is not an easy task. Especially when there are so many switches and breakers a pilot needs to be familiar with. Let alone what happens when you shut something off. It takes rational thinking; and if you're in a life & death situation suddenly and almost inexplicably, rational thought kind of goes out the window.
...
I just discovered this category of threads. I find it interesting, and am jumping into this one quite late. Nevertheless, I have to agree that a big problem with the FAA giving this aircraft a certificate to operate possibly has a lot to do with lobbying. They say everyone has a price. And if you're willing to pony up enough cash, suddenly it becomes easy to rationalize that disaster is unlikely, therefore go ahead and accept the cash and approve the plane.

The professional pilots here had no problem following the procedure to cut the stab trip switches. What problematical is the MCAS system put them in a no-win trim position at high speed that was unrecoverable at low ground altitude. The FAA gave a certificate to operate the aircraft because they trusted Boeing and their ability to build safe aircraft. That trust is now in a hole in Africa but it wasn't then. There was absolutely no reason to lobby or pony up enough cash to issue a certificate for basically a plane they had been building since 1968. Attributing malice to human failings is typical of conspiracy theories.

 

There was absolutely no reason to lobby or pony up enough cash to issue a certificate for basically a plane they had been building since 1968. Attributing malice to human failings is typical of conspiracy theories.

Perhaps. But this sort of thing goes on all the time.

Back in the 70's I worked for MacDonald Douglas, building DC-9's and 10's. Back then it was well known that Boeing was goosing the news media outlets against the DC lines for the sake of bolstering their own sales. There's a lot that goes on behind the scenes.

We regularly have a diet of commercials that say nothing but leave the viewer with the impression their product is the best. One such was a commercial for a cell phone carrier. They said "Nobody has a more powerful network." And that's true. What it leaves is the impression that theirs is the "MOST" powerful, when ALL carriers are regulated to the same level of power. It's all about public perception. And Boeing is no stranger to the tactic. Car companies advertise that their vehicle is "Best In Class". Which means nothing, unless ALL vehicles are in a standard set of classes. At presents they're at liberty to define their own class. So when they say "Best in class for towing" they're referring to their engine size, transmission and running gear packages. Their vehicle is often the ONLY one in that class. So Best In Class means nothing. Yet the consumer swallows it hook, line and sinker.

With the aircraft industry, selling something (without malice intended) with features is just another way to bolster a companies income. Buy this. It has a NEW SAFETY FEATURE. And we all think WOW! What they're really selling is an unproven safety feature. I recall a Feminine Hygiene product named "RELY" The ad said "Remember, they named it 'Rely'." Ended up giving many women Toxic Shock Syndrome.

My point is that just because someone says it's "New and Improved" doesn't mean it's safer - or better. They just rebranded it like the newer MD-11, which is still built on many of the old DC-10 jigs. There ARE significant changes to the design, but because it's so close to the DC-10 people still don't want to fly on it. It's all about public perception. As I mentioned before, landing a jet on a dump truck is going to have disastrous consequences no matter WHAT jet you try the stunt with.

I don't like the 737. Period. Max, Min, Mid models - I just don't like them. Flying is something we do regularly, and with a very high probability of surviving the experience. But when one goes down it makes big news. I've heard (can't say "I know") the plane was lobbied for. As you said, it is easy for the FAA to grant a certificate of airworthiness with a company that has a long standing history of successful operations. Nevertheless, they don't leave anything to chance when it comes to hitting the marketplace. Hence, the assumed "No Retraining Necessary" sales pitch. Carriers are excited when you tell them you're going to save them money.

Conspiracy? Maybe. I don't know. But I suspect there's more to it than pure and honest "Oops! Didn't foresee that happening." Otherwise why would they have included a "Kill" switch for their MCAS? I'm sure you'll have an argument against that. That's OK. We all have opinions here. We all are entitled to express them. I believe as I do. Maybe foolishly. Maybe not. But this is mine.

 

Conspiracy? Maybe. I don't know. But I suspect there's more to it than pure and honest "Oops! Didn't foresee that happening." Otherwise why would they have included a "Kill" switch for their MCAS? I'm sure you'll have an argument against that. That's OK. We all have opinions here. We all are entitled to express them. I believe as I do. Maybe foolishly. Maybe not. But this is mine.

The 'KILL' switch (stab trim cutout) is in every model of every airplane in the air as it's required by FAA rules for augmentation systems of any kind dating back to the original 737 in 1968. That's not an argument, it's a provable fact. I think Boeing is absolutely responsible here but going on a snark hunt is out there.

 

The 'KILL' switch (stab trim cutout) is in every model of every airplane in the air as it's required by FAA rules for augmentation systems of any kind dating back to the original 737 in 1968. That's not an argument, it's a provable fact.

Accepted.

So why was it so hard to find in an emergency? Lack of training maybe?

 

Accepted.

So why was it so hard to find in an emergency? Lack of training maybe?

It wasn't hard to find in this emergency as it's a memory item all pilots are tested on during a runaway stab simulation. They followed the proper procedure and used it to remove MCAS (and all augmentation systems). Unfortunately they flipped the switch back ON (not in the normal procedure but understandable due to the circumstances where the pilot assumes total authority to fly the plane) and sealed their fate with a 500MPH nose dive into the ground when MCAS pointed the nose back down after their heroic efforts to recover from the original MCAS driven trim response.

 

it's a memory item

How many other items must be remembered? And in a simulation it's easier to remember than when you're suddenly faced with a critical situation.

I haven't read any final findings reports. Are there any final findings? Do we really know exactly what happened on board the flight deck? If so - I'm not aware of them. I may be speaking in total ignorance. Wouldn't be the first time for me. But if there've been a lot of reports of problems then why was it not addressed sooner?

I remember installing AOA sensors on the noses of 9's and 10's. I recall a particular 9 that had the jig mis-aligned and the sensor didn't fit in properly. As an assembler I reported it. The decision was made to grind away the fuselage so the sensor could fit into its bracket. That left an unacceptable gap on one side of the sensor. They slathered it with sealant. Probably never caused a problem, but the other solution would have been to remove that skin and re-skin it. A much more costly repair than just gooping up the gap.

 

They did the memory item in the correct sequence during the actual emergency. You practice in the sim (computer or mockup) until it's a automatic response to the stimuli in every type of job that needs X procedure done for X set of happenstances. Pilots are not unique in this type of training.

https://www.aviationtoday.com/2019/...-737-max-crash-report-similar-lion-air-crash/

The final report will take at least a year.

 

@nsaspook Thanks for the report.

Interesting note from the report says:

As pilots have told us, erroneous activation of the MCAS function can add to what is already a high workload environment.

That is kind of my point.

I recall an incident where a pilot was napping on a long overnight flight. The copilot was a freshman too. The co was instructed to not wake the pilot until they reached their destination. Upon doing so the pilot was slow to wake, and therefore the plane had come closer to the runway than anticipated. It's also worthy to note that this particular airport was a difficult approach airport and required well seasoned and skilled pilots to perform. Though awake the pilot was still in the groggy state and the approach was going badly. The co kept saying "GO AROUND! GO AROUND! But the pilot was certain he could pull off a successful landing. He went off the end of the runway and killed a lot of people.

I'm not a pilot. Never have been, though I did control a Cesna Citation once when working for a small aircraft depot. Controlled it for what seemed like an hour but was probably more on the order of two or three minutes over the desert in California. What a blast that was. But even a skilled and well trained pilot can be in a compromising situation. Can be distracted, can be inebriated, can be a lot of things. None of which are rare, though uncommon to most western carriers. Hopefully. But after a long flight (and I don't know how long those flights were) a pilot can be "not thinking" and overlook something critical. We mess with electronics all the time. How many times have you been shocked by mains power? It happens. Doesn't mean you're not qualified, just means you let your guard down for the wrong moment.

I'm not blaming the pilots in these accidents. I'm just saying in a heavy stress work environment, I can understand work case overload. That along with a malfunctioning aircraft - - - . Like Boeing said, it takes a chain of events. And so is true of car crashes. When one person makes a mistake it's often not an issue. But where two mistakes or more are made at the same place and time it often results in an accident. Like Boeing said "Chain". Short-selling this possibility is irresponsible. To claim "No Training Required" is negligent in my opinion. And may be done as a selling point. Shame on the ones who practice this.

 

@nsaspook Thanks for the report.

Interesting note from the report says:

As pilots have told us, erroneous activation of the MCAS function can add to what is already a high workload environment.

That is kind of my point.

I recall an incident where a pilot was napping on a long overnight flight. The copilot was a freshman too. The co was instructed to not wake the pilot until they reached their destination. Upon doing so the pilot was slow to wake, and therefore the plane had come closer to the runway than anticipated. It's also worthy to note that this particular airport was a difficult approach airport and required well seasoned and skilled pilots to perform. Though awake the pilot was still in the groggy state and the approach was going badly. The co kept saying "GO AROUND! GO AROUND! But the pilot was certain he could pull off a successful landing. He went off the end of the runway and killed a lot of people.

I'm not a pilot. Never have been, though I did control a Cesna Citation once when working for a small aircraft depot. Controlled it for what seemed like an hour but was probably more on the order of two or three minutes over the desert in California. What a blast that was. But even a skilled and well trained pilot can be in a compromising situation. Can be distracted, can be inebriated, can be a lot of things. None of which are rare, though uncommon to most western carriers. Hopefully. But after a long flight (and I don't know how long those flights were) a pilot can be "not thinking" and overlook something critical. We mess with electronics all the time. How many times have you been shocked by mains power? It happens. Doesn't mean you're not qualified, just means you let your guard down for the wrong moment.

I'm not blaming the pilots in these accidents. I'm just saying in a heavy stress work environment, I can understand work case overload. That along with a malfunctioning aircraft - - - . Like Boeing said, it takes a chain of events. And so is true of car crashes. When one person makes a mistake it's often not an issue. But where two mistakes or more are made at the same place and time it often results in an accident. Like Boeing said "Chain". Short-selling this possibility is irresponsible. To claim "No Training Required" is negligent in my opinion. And may be done as a selling point. Shame on the ones who practice this.

"No Training Required" is shared negligence in my opinion. Dropping the 'training' requirement on Boeing lap is not seeing the root cause of why "No Training Required" was highly desirable by all parties involved including the Pilots. As in most human endeavors that result in failure, the execution was flawed, not the motivation.

 

I like the whole part, except at the last when he said automation was coming to cars. I do not like the idea of software approved driving.

But you have no problem with it being done over head by airplanes? Your response doesn't make that clear. Many more people survive a car crash than do a plane crash.

 

"No Training Required" is shared negligence in my opinion. Dropping the 'training' requirement on Boeing lap is not seeing the root cause of why "No Training Required" was highly desirable by all parties involved including the Pilots.

Again I agree. But who was it who said "No Training Required"? SURE pilots loved that idea. It meant they were qualified to fly another plane. I still see it as a marketing ploy by Boeing.

When you started driving you did everything you had to just to pass the test. I'm not saying this of YOU, I'm saying this of many drivers around here. They get their license proving they can successfully operate a motor vehicle. Yet, what I see on the roadway amazes me all the time. Many of these people have no business being the wheel. Big Truck Drivers too! But back to where I was going with this: After learning to drive and getting your license, did you take further safety training? If so it was probably smart of you. But likely not deemed as necessary. If you got into an accident I wouldn't blame the car manufacturer because they never said additional training was required. Some of us have had additional training. Not me. But some of us have attended schools that train us how to handle a vehicle in a slide, in snow and ice, and even in defensive driving. But most of us take that for granted.

I'm no Airframe & Electronics engineer. But I think (hindsight) an MCAS system that looks at both AOA sensors, should one of them go down - or diverge from the other, the MCAS should automatically give an aural warning and shut down. Should not be restarted until recycling the power. And again, if the sensors disagree, shut down again. And again and again and again until maintenance FIXES the issue. (hindsight is 20/20) It looks to me like Boeing missed an opportunity to make a truly safe system, one that shuts itself off.

What I DO know about aircraft is that they have two AOA sensors and two artificial horizons. It shouldn't be that hard to integrate into the MCAS to read all these things and determine which sensor is in default. But if you're operating on a single sensor input - - - what can you expect when that particular sensor fails. And from what I'm hearing, failures of the AOA are more common than I would have thought.

I'm not arguing with you. I agree with pretty much everything you've said. There ARE a few points we diverge on, but that's what makes things better, when we look at a situation from multiple points of view.

 

Tony see my earlier post. The fix was available and worked but was an extra charge that most didn't buy.

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/21/business/boeing-safety-features-charge.html
The airlines can charge for baggage so why can't Boeing charge for safety features ?

 

Tony see my earlier post. The fix was available and worked but was an extra charge that most didn't buy.

Those are nice to have items but they are not solutions to the root cause of these crashes. The fix here is not indicators, the fix is pilot command authority being more powerful than automation in an emergency before aerodynamic forces preclude effective countermeasures under manual control.

 

"Operationally suitable" are words that should inspire confidence coming from FAA.

What is operationally suitable? When I fix equipment, i can deem it operationally suitable at my discretion as needs call. Does it mean it performs to its full requirements? Not necessarily. That is an odd choice of words.

Sounds like the lack of training issue is not being addressed and they are looking to stick with the claim that this plane is like any other 737?

https://simpleflying.com/737-max-operationally-suitable/amp/

Those are nice to have items but they are not solutions to the root cause of these crashes. The fix here is not indicators, the fix is pilot command authority being more powerful than automation in an emergency before aerodynamic forces preclude effective countermeasures under manual control.

I am curious about the following: At what point does adding automation that can fail become an issue? How many systems should we expect a human operator to be able to override to recover in an emergency situation when software either fails or encounters an unfamiliar situation? Have you ever had to deal with a piece of equipment that keeps rebooting and will not shut off? It is unnerving to say the least.

 

"Operationally suitable" are words that should inspire confidence coming from FAA.

What is operationally suitable? When I fix equipment, i can deem it operationally suitable at my discretion as needs call. Does it mean it performs to its full requirements? Not necessarily. That is an odd choice of words.

Sounds like the lack of training issue is not being addressed and they are looking to stick with the claim that this plane is like any other 737?

https://simpleflying.com/737-max-operationally-suitable/amp/

I am curious about the following: At what point does adding automation that can fail become an issue? How many systems should we expect a human operator to be able to override to recover in an emergency situation when software either fails or encounters an unfamiliar situation? Have you ever had to deal with a piece of equipment that keeps rebooting and will not shut off? It is unnerving to say the least.

This plane is just like almost any other plane. The 737 Max is not unstable and trim must be able to overpower normal pilot control surfaces. That's true from a Cessna to a commercial jet.

As for this emergency, the override (cutout switches and procedures to use them) can dump you in a no-win for sure. The problem with MCAS automation is not overrides, the problem is that you need to drop to manual when you normally need automation the most. The plane is going fast, the nose is pointing down, the stick in shaking, the alarm is sounding and everyone on-board is fearing death. Good automation saves lives as systems rarely hand you manual control when the system is fully functional -- they do it when something fails.

 

 

This plane is just like almost any other plane. The 737 Max is not unstable and trim must be able to overpower normal pilot control surfaces. That's true from a Cessna to a commercial jet.

As for this emergency, the override (cutout switches and procedures to use them) can dump you in a no-win for sure. The problem with MCAS automation is not overrides, the problem is that you need to drop to manual when you normally need automation the most. The plane is going fast, the nose is pointing down, the stick in shaking, the alarm is sounding and everyone on-board is fearing death. Good automation saves lives as systems rarely hand you manual control when the system is fully functional -- they do it when something fails.

That is an interesting point of view. Perhaps you would like to compare it to another industry? Please go to MAUDE data base from FDA and have a look see on all the software failures for life support equipment and recommendatuons on how to live with them until fixed. It is an uphill battle of humans living with software failure.