This is a instance where a stable air-frame (This thread was based on the premise of faulty air-frame, that's been proven wrong several times) was destabilized by a horrifically badly designed software system and management decisions to limit pilot knowledge of how that system worked. The fix (runaway trim) was always just to turn off MCAS, keep MCAS off and manually trim the aircraft. The published FIX does exactly that with redundancy checks for proper sensor operation but the end result is still manual flying.To inject , my other side of work over the years has been more military
In military jets, they are inherently unstable, without the computer, they can not be hand flown,
Look at the space shuttle, that was the same, no computer, impossible to control in the atmosphere above Mach 1 , "glide" slope of around 20 degrees, all but a crash.
Nothing inherently wrong with a software controlled plane,
OK, most military planes you have the chance of getting out,
unlike the shuttle or passenger planes,
But the idea that s/w can be just used to patch a problem it was not designed for, can just be outsourced to the cheapest bidder with minimal oversite / control , as seems to be the case in Boeing, is just crazy. ..
How did they ever get away with the redundant tubes sensors being an optional at cost extra ?
How did they get away with the optional readout to indicate that the sensors might be wrong as an optional at cost extra !!